|
|
|
XI. UNION EXCLUSION IN
THE UNITED STATES, UNITED KINGDOM, AND WESTERN EUROPE
Employer Opposition
to Union Recognition in Britain
GREGOR
GALL
University
of Stirling
Abstract
This
paper examines evidence of employers' attempts to resist campaigns for
union recognition in Britain from the period (mid-1995) in which it
became clear a statutory route to union recognition would be legislated
for. It documents the extent and nature of these employer activities
and develops a revised schema, following from Roy (1980) to help understand
and interpret the use of certain anti-union activities and the relationship
between these tactics.
Introduction
For
the first time in 20 years in Britain large numbers of non-union employers
are now seriously considering the issue of granting union recognition
(UR). This results not merely from the introduction of statutory provisions
for gaining UR within the Employment Relations Act 1999 (ERA), but also
the heightened level of union recruitment and recognition activity within
an improved industrial–political environment (from Westminster and
Brussels) for trade unionism (Gall and McKay 1999; Heery et al. 2000a,
2000b). After a prolonged and entrenched period of "managerial Thatcherism",
evidence exists of employer opposition to granting UR as these two trajectories
come together. This paper reviews the extent of these manifestations,
and then examines and analyzes the various components and purposes of
this employer behavior by developing Roy's (1980) schema on management
tactics for remaining "union-free". The efficacy of this revised
schema is then evaluated in terms of its ability to better understand
this emerging facet of employer behavior.
Thus
the paper examines the period from whence it became clear that the Labour
Party would win the 1997 general election and implement its promise to
legislate to establish a statutory mechanism for gaining UR. This can
be dated from around mid-1995. From the publication of the manifesto in
late 1996, to the election in May 1997, to the publication of Fairness
at Work (early 1998) and the publication of the Employment Relations
Bill (early 1999), the passing of the Bill on July 29, 1999, and the
enactment of the provisions on June 6, 2000, the issue of UR has, in tandem
with greater union campaigning activity and success in gaining agreements,
increasingly weighed heavily on the minds of a large number of employers.
Employer
Anti-Unionism
Traditionally
employer's attempts to remain "union free" have been categorized
as policies of union suppression or substitution (Beaumont
1987:26; Blyton and Turnbull 1998:267), or of control or avoidance.
Some variations exist--see for example the "good", "bad",
"lucky" and "ugly" of Guest and Hoque (1994). Nonetheless,
this dichotomy is useful in distinguishing between employer activities
which seek to provide positive benefits for nonmembership in order to
reduce the propensity of workers to unionize and to seek UR, and those
which seek to impose costs on workers joining unions to reduce their propensity
to unionize/seek UR. However the limitations are two-fold. First, there
is no Chinese wall between the two approaches (and attendant techniques).
A single employer may use both at the same moment across space and time
or either at different moments in space and time as is seen fit. Second,
employer activities which seek to determine the form of UR by choosing
which union is recognized, imposing "sweetheart" terms or establishing
means to undermine the worth of UR cannot be readily accommodated.
However,
Roy (1980) provides an alternative schema for classifying employer resistance
to unionization and by implication UR--namely, "fear", "sweet",
"evil" and "fatal" stuffs. Despite the schema being
devised from the experience of the United States (and its "Deep South"),
it can be usefully deployed to consider employer attempts to resist UR
campaigns in Britain. "Fear stuff" refers to acts of intimidation
and suppression, designed to "instill dread in regard of what management
might do" (Roy 1980:409) about union recruitment and recognition
campaigns. "Sweet stuff" refers to acts of union substitutionism,
which are designed to obviate the need for trade unionism per se, but
specifically, membership of a union and UR for representation and collective
bargaining. "Evil stuff" refers to ideological acts and propaganda
designed to create "a robust detestation of what unions are by nature"
(Roy 1980:409), often being communist witch-hunting and "red"-baiting.
Finally "fatal stuff" refers to attempts to prevent the signing
of a recognition agreement leading to negotiations and particularly bargaining
on pay and conditions.
Although
Roy (1980) recognizes a stage to employer resistance after it has failed
to prevent the granting of UR--that is, "fatal stuff"--further
approaches can be specified. "Awkward stuff" is about providing
obstacles to the union that appear to be "fair" and "legitimate"
like stonewalling, requiring ballots and refusing access to private premises.
"Tame stuff" seeks to select the type of union and the type
of agreement. It is thus about both "damage limitation" and
the deployment of UR for business purposes. "Harm stuff", rather
than attempting to wreck the new agreement through bargaining in "bad
faith", seeks to marginalize it by establishing other channels of
non-union communication and consultation. Using this seven-fold schema,
the form and purpose of employer anti-union behavior and activities in
Britain in the period 1995 to 2001 are examined and classified from the
data collected.
Methodology
The
data primarily draw on material from interviews with union officersinterviews
carried out with regional and national full-time officers in early 1999
(14), early 2000 (20) and early 2001 (25) from the AEEU, BECTU, BIFU,
CWU, GMB, GPMU, ISTC, MSF, NUJ, TGWU, TSSA, Unison and USDAW unions. From
2000 the same union officials were reinterviewed along with new ones.
Labor movement publications were surveyed, ranging from journals of unions
themselves, to TUC reports, to Labour Research, Trade Union News, the
Morning Star, Socialist Worker and the labournet and labourstart
websites. The determinations of the Central Arbitration Committee (CAC),
the body charged by the ERA with adjudicating on applications for UR,
were also utilized. Generally speaking, applications are for UR in companies
that are hostile, as opposed to just reluctant, to granting UR. Reasonable
inferences are thus drawn. Finally local, regional and national press
through the Lexis–Nexis database were surveyed, and information gained
from attendance at various union-orientated conferences (e.g., Institute
of Employment Rights, Labour Research Department, TUC) on union organizing.
In
presenting evidence of employer anti-union behavior, only "corroborated"
cases are used. By this it is meant that: (1) rather than relying on self-reported
cases by the aggrieved party (i.e., the unions) through interviews, only
those cases reported by unions which could then be verified by third parties
(i.e., the media) are used. Whilst this does not guarantee absolute veracity,
given the decline of independent media investigation, it does nonetheless
indicate that the allegations are not regarded as without basis and thus
libelous; and (2) that where a union reports on employer activity in its
own journals and publications, it is deduced that this is not without
basis and thus libelous. However this has the effect of reducing the incidences
of employer anti-union behavior that can be drawn upon.
Extent
and Context of Anti-Unionism
Before
examining the nature and specific tactical purposes of different forms
of anti-unionism, for the purposes of contextualization, it is necessary
to map out the extent of the decline in UR, employer opposition to UR
and the legal status of anti-unionism.
(i) Union Recognition
and Derecognition
WERS98
records the number of workplaces with UR falling from 53 percent in 1990
to 45 percent in 1998 (Cully et al. 1999:92–93). The Labour Force
Survey (Bland 1999) shows a similar trend in regard of coverage of UR,
falling from 48.9 percent of workers in 1993 to 43.5 percent in 1998.
Other research has demonstrated that that incidences of derecognition
increased from relatively small levels in the late 1980s to become significantly
greater in the early 1990s (Claydon 1996; Gall and McKay 1994). However
Gall and McKay (1999, 2001) highlighted that, with regard to the relative
incidences of derecognition and new recognition agreements, the picture
in the late 1990s appears to have reversed from that which existed in
the early 1990s.
(ii) Employers Against
Recognition
Existing
within a general fall in the coverage of UR, there is some survey and
case-study evidence of moves amongst employers to offer opposition to
granting UR (Brown et al. 1998:35; Dibb Lupton Alsop 1999, 2000; Dundon
2001; Heery 2000:2–4). The CBI (1999:3) found in late 1999 that 18
percent of respondents would "definitely" and 45 percent "possibly"
be prepared to "fight recognition, if necessary through the statutory
procedure". From this we can posit, first, that there are many hundreds
of cases where there is serious employer opposition to granting UR despite
a significant union presence. Employers in these situations are likely
to have made some calculation of the probability of union success, the
costs of opposition and UR.
(iii) Legal Status of
Anti-Unionism
While
the ERA's provisions on UR are important in informing the overall context
for unions seeking UR, they are silent with regard to employer behavior
before and during UR campaigns. With the accent on voluntarism and avoiding
further juridification, employers and unions are being encouraged to achieve
voluntary deals. Unions are keen to avoid the prospect of failure should
they use the CAC,1
while employers are often unwilling to the subject to what
they see as intrusive intervention. Therefore, for the anti-union employer,
considerable room exists to engage in anti-union behavior, as the union
is not always willing to wield the CAC sanction. Furthermore in the voluntary
setting, the employer is not bound by any legal or regulatory framework
promoting or obliging "fair play" such as access to workers
and members. Indeed the CAC will not intervene (i.e., accept an application)
unless the union can show clear evidence of it seeking a voluntary approach
first.
Once
an application has been accepted, the CAC still has no jurisdiction over
the employer to see that "fair play" is adhered to. The only
point at which the CAC can enforce access is during the period of a CAC-authorized
ballot. Thus if the application goes through the automatic (i.e., audit)
route, the employer has an incentive to influence the level of membership
until the audit, which may be a longer period than the minimum if the
employer wishes to be seen to be attempting to reach a voluntary deal
for alternative motives. Until the period of the ballot, the employer
also has incentive to influence the level of membership and employees'
views on UR.
A
Revised Schema of Anti-Unionism
Under
the revised schema of anti-unionism and where unions are campaigning for
UR or where UR has recently been granted, data on an array of different
anti-union tactics and actions is presented. This does not mean there
are no implications for employer anti-unionism in general, anti-unionism
in the context of long-standing UR and union presence, or derecognition.
But these are not the foci here. Furthermore, the schema does not address
the issues of managerial style and practices which in general may be seen
as intimidatory and oppressive towards workers but are not necessarily
prima facie evidence of conscious and explicit anti-unionism. Similarly,
the focus is not on managerial behavior and policies to avoid unionization
or managerial responses to unionization per se (see Dickson et al. 1988)
but only where certain levels of unionization are attained, and this itself,
or allied to campaigning activity, means that UR becomes a serious prospect.
Fear
Stuff
The
purpose of this is to kill off existing or expected attempts at union
organization and requests for UR, or at least prevent them from getting
to a "critical mass", which increasingly is being related to
the stipulations set by the ERA on numerical thresholds (40 percent or
50 percent of the workforce). The strategy is based on intimidation and
creating an atmosphere of fear and trepidation, suggesting to the workforce
that it is the union that is the source of "trouble" and "conflict".
The
most obvious tools are the sackings, dismissals and redundancies, or the
threats of them. These are achieved by the targeting of the shop steward(s)
or leading activists through the stringent implementation of time-keeping
and sick/absence policies, and monitoring of work performance. Thus employers
have been cute enough to sack union activists for apparently legitimate
reasons.2 These
actions seek to try to prevent or stop union lay officers from being active
in dealing with members' concerns, organizing meetings, producing publicity
material and recruiting new members. Thirty examples of such tactics leading
to dismissal exist in nonrecognized or derecognized workplaces.3
These actions are also meant to send signals to existing
members about the response they face if they become active in the union
and to say to potential members that the union and its activities are
unwelcome. Alternatively redundancies targeted at union members may create
a fear of amongst other workers about being members or being active and
so reduce the number of and density of union members to weaken a UR request
(12 cases). Underlying these particular "fear stuff" tactics
is often a general view held by workers that the employer "won't
allow us to join a union", as one worker expressed this. The belief
is that sackings or victimization will follow such a course. Although
illegal to do so, employers have made such statements and let such views
develop in seven cases (see also Dundon 2001).
An
array of other tactics is also being used by employers to resist UR. There
is a strong union suspicion that management plants are being used at some
union meetings to find out how, when and where the union is organizing
its UR campaign in order to combat it. Other examples exist of videotaping
through CCTV, or supervisors or others workers being seen to note those
that speak to union organizers at gates to the company's premises and
or those that speak to the union rep inside work. Such people are then
spoken to by managers about their retrograde actions. Twelve examples
of these tactics have been found. A number of instances have been reported
of employers providing standardized union resignation forms. Five cases
exist of companies organizing petitions and letters from the employees
denouncing the union. Amongst the use of "fear stuff" there
is some evidence of the use of anti-union consultants and legal firms
in attempts to deter unionization and UR, whether of U.S. or "indigenous"
law firms and consultants (seven cases).
Elsewhere
a "blacklist" is reported to exist against OILC activists through
the "Not Required Back" system used by North Sea oil contractors.4
More sophisticated methods which have been used include
specific captive meetings and written and oral communications warning
about the "union threat" to the company's health and profitability
and thus to wage levels and jobs (twenty-four cases). The less subtle
threat of promising to shut the entire factory down if UR is forced upon
the employer is known of in five cases and carried out in one case.
Sweet
Stuff
This
strategy seeks to make the organization "an issue-free company"
by supplanting the union role through showing it is unnecessary. Methods
include resolving, or being seen to resolve, grievances and establishing
"independent" and non-union related mechanisms for resolving
grievances and giving expression to employee "voice". Thus employers
seek to convince workers that there are no issues of contention, should
any arise they can be easily resolved to the satisfaction of both parties,
that the presence of a union is unnecessary and there is a community of
interests between workforce and employer.
A
commonly practiced tactic is the sudden resolution of long-standing grievances,
better than expected pay increases and general improvements in working
conditions (cf. McCarthy 1999:41). These are usually set in train after
employers recognize they face a serious UR campaign (seventeen cases).
Another tactic is the promotion of the policy of their managers' doors
"always being open for little chats" or the promotion of one-to-one
communication (nine cases). However more noticeable are attempts to formalize
and institutionalize non-unionism by establishing "consultative"
or "representative" forums, where staff issues and grievances
can be dealt with (see also Brown et al. 1998:74) and Terry (1999:21)).
While such institutions in non-union settings have a relatively low incidence
(Cully et al.1999), they appear to be relatively more common in situations
where the employer opposes a campaign for UR. Some 80 organizations are
known to have employed this technique to avoid recognition, while another
forty are known to have used this to maintain derecognition. Less common
are the cases of employer attempts to establish a staff association/union,
either from scratch or from their consultative council (six cases).
Evil
Stuff
Red-baiting
of unions and communist witch-hunting of activists in UR campaigns have
not been detected; this is not surprising given the differences in political
culture between the United States and Britain. However, this does not
imply that employers have not deployed "evil stuff". Some employers
have circulated literature and made presentations that denigrate unions
in terms of their threat to jobs and industrial harmony at their workplace
(see above). More pertinent here has been the distribution of materials,
particularly by newspaper companies, which argue that unions are parasitic
(they want your money to pay for their empires), are undemocratic (run
by cliques) and can make their members do things that members do not want
to do (go on strike following a mandate from a ballot). A more overtly
political thrust to the anti-unionism emerges when employers link the
union "threat" at the workplace with the union "threat"
to society. They argue that "returning to the bad old days"
of powerful unions would mean more strikes, conflict and economic decline.
They ask the question, "Surely, you don't want to go back to those
days?"
Fatal
Stuff
Fatal stuff
is also known in the United States as "bad faith bargaining".
It represents a rearguard action by the employer to undermine or indeed
rescind the earlier decision to grant UR. The most common methods are
to offer no or low pay raises, no or slight improvements in conditions
and to continually refuse to, or delay in, responding to union requests
for information and meetings. Here the employer is trying to show that
not only has union membership no benefits but that it is a hopeless task
trying to prove otherwise. Activists' enthusiasm is thus ground down.
Casualization and redundancies can also be used here to undermine UR.
Of the former, only a handful of examples have been found. The same is
true of the latter. This is likely to reflect the relative recentness
of UR agreements so that there has so far been little opportunity in which
this may occur and, more importantly, the greater difficulty in halting,
at this early stage, the forward momentum that the union has established.
Tame
Stuff
Single
union deals and union "beauty contests" to determine these deals,
where there is multiunionism or competing union, are now more common that
at any time since the early 1990s. Some 90 examples are known such deals
being signed or employers asking for these deals. Employers here have
recognized the question they face is not "do we grant UR or not?"
but "to whom should we grant UR?" Faced by "irresistible"
requests for UR by virtue of union strength, this type of employer is
attempting to dictate the nature of the UR by selecting what they see
as the "appropriate" union for themselves. Often they will invite
interested unions to outline the types of UR agreements they are prepared
to offer before selecting who will be chosen. What is meant by "appropriate"
may be a union prepared to eschew traditional bargaining in favor of "business
unionism" or "social partnership".
Further
pressure for single union deals has emerged because the ERA is predisposed
to single union deals whereby a claim for UR can only be made by a single
union5 and
because new claims for UR cannot be made where there is already recognition.
This may place a premium on employers signing deals with certain unions
to preempt the recognition of other unions under the ERA. Areas of industry
and services where such deals have become noticeable include airlines,
transport, electronics, offshore oil industry and private prisons. Of
the CAC cases that have been adjudicated on, three organizations have
recently signed single union deals to avoid other unions. Nonetheless
there are at least 15 cases where unions regarded as "inappropriate"
have been able to gain UR with the support of the other "involved"
unions.
Often
part of single union deals are constrained UR agreements. Those unions
that have signed single union deals are generally more likely to also
sign constrained UR agreements. However where the employer has no choice
of which union to recognize, given union strength, the employer can seek
to impose constrained UR agreements as the price for granting UR. Both
are done with a view not merely to lessening the concessions an employer
may have to grant in bargaining but also to establish the limited nature
of the new relationship and provide the option for returning to nonrecognition
by undermining the faith of the members in their union. The components
are the procedural de facto no-strike/no-disruption clauses by virtue
of an extended disputes procedure, compulsory and or binding arbitration,
and restricted bargaining scope. However this may also extend the restricted
substantive and relationship issues like initial pay freezes and partnership
clauses.
Constrained
bargaining agreements are thus examples of pre-bargaining "concession
bargaining". They undermine unions' potential strength and independence
by relinquishing the sanction of industrial action, and by muddying the
waters on what the purpose of the union is by insisting on the compatibility
of employee–employer interests. Forms of "enterprise unionism"
may ensue. The other side to "tame stuff" is that employers
having decided to recognize are concerned not only to limit UR but to
make that which is granted work for them. Here employers seek to realize
the "business case" for granting UR, primarily ease of communication
and legitimacy to joint decisions.
Awkward
Stuff
Given
the relational situation where a union requires something from an employer
(i.e., their consent and cooperation) and where there is an imbalance
of power, employers have often used basic stonewalling tactics to frustrate
and demobilize recognition campaigns. Refusal to reply to the union's
letters, refusal to have meetings or discussions, refusal to allow access
to the organization's premises for recruiting and organizing and refusal
to allow members to meet on the organization's premises are the stock
in trade of anti-union employers. Together some 50 cases of these are
known. If a union has overstretched officer resources, little or no membership
at the workplace, or a membership that is not assertive or active then
these tactics are likely to lead the union to walk away from continuing
or mounting a campaign. Should a union persist and get to the point where
UR becomes more of a prospect, other methods are available to employers
to frustrate the union. These include the restructuring of the company
by splitting up the organization into separate legal personalities (seven
cases), the contracting out of certain activities to influence union density
and the introduction of personal contracts to take some members out of
the potential for union membership and recognition. An emerging issue,
particularly in CAC cases, is the enlargening of the bargaining unit to
reduce the level of union density by including other workers (11 cases).
While
the use of ballots by employers to determine the level of support for
UR has not been unknown in the past, it is now the prime method of assessment
because of the ERA's impact. Over 150 cases exist where employers have
requested a union majority before discussions could commence. The increased
workload of ACAS (2000, 2001) in conducting ballots (and membership audits)
is further testament to this growing phenomenon. The commonplace setting
of thresholds for voting in a ballot are likely to make some employers
more resistant to granting UR under the voluntary mechanism such that
they will insist on at least 50 percent+1 support. And with the increased
likelihood of employers requiring ballots in voluntary recognition claims,
there will now be a value to some employers to seek to influence the outcome
of the ballot by whatever means they see fit and are permitted to.
There
are further twists to the tactical use of ballots by anti-union employers.
The first is the use of a ballot is to challenge unions before they are
"ready". The use of ballots appears to be a fair means by which
to test the level of support for UR. However employers by challenging
the union before it has secured a high level of strong support are attempting
to settle the issue for perpetuity. Unions have lost these votes in nine
cases. The second is where the employer has agreed to hold a ballot but
still refuses to grant recognition when the union wins the ballot. This
is evidence of employers trying to exhaust and then demoralize the union
presence by going through the processing of holding the ballot then ignoring
the result. Six cases exist of this. The third is to deny the union and
workers the opportunity to demonstrate their majority support in a ballot
by refusing to hold a ballot.
Finally
a further tactic has been to stall on negotiations for creating a procedural
agreement and delay the signing of such an agreement to undermine the
momentum and force of the union's victory in a recognition ballot (five
cases). This puts back further the possibility of substantive bargaining.
In one CAC automatic award, the employer had sought judicial review.
Harm
Stuff
Rather
than strike a lethal blow to UR with an "iron fist" as "fatal
stuff" attempts to do, the "velvet glove" is placed around
the iron fist for "harm stuff" whereby indirect assaults are
made on the worth and mechanisms of UR and bargaining. Thus instead of
having direct and exclusive bilateral relations between the union and
management, recognition and bargaining are conducted through works councils
or similar fora in which there is representation for non-union workers
and/or the union has to compete in elections to secure seats. In addition,
or separately, employers have established parallel means of communication
and consultation with their workforces in order to sideline or counter
the importance of the union and UR. Employers are trying not only to undermine
the value of the union and bargaining but also to show that there is a
credible alternative to what is proving to be a more conflict ridden and
unproductive mechanism (fourteen cases).
Discussion
The
revised schema is shown to be more able to categorize and distinguish
between the complex array of different types and forms of employer anti-union
behavior. It can better situate and locate anti-unionism because of its
higher specification than the simple dichotomy. Furthermore it can be
viewed in such a way as to understand the use of a selection of one or
more of the seven approaches at any one point in time or space, as well
as their use sequentially where a number of approaches can be deployed
should the earlier use of other ones fail to deliver the required outcome.
Most obviously this would concern continuing anti-unionism before and
after UR was granted. With the schema, we can also see that a works council
or anti-union literature can be used to play different roles in different
contexts, again mostly clearly before or after UR. Clearly the tactics
outline here could be deployed by employers that approximate to the ideal
types of "traditionalist" and "sophisticated paternalists"
(Purcell and Sisson 1983).
The
data has uncovered a considerable number of instances of anti-union employer
behavior. Employers are trying to influence workers' values, perceptions
and outcomes as well as tailoring workers' agendas and workplace institutions
and organizational settings to their needs along the spectrum from avoidance
to control. Both avoidance and control involve employers trying by different
means to put "distance" between the union and its members, potential
members and supporters. This may range from views and perceptions of impotence
and risk and danger by association to ideological hostility. Considering
the tactics themselves, some are more evident because the majority of
cases of opposition are in their infancy (given the recent increase in
new campaigns for UR and new UR deals; Gall and McKay 2001) and at the
start of what may be termed a "sequential process" of opposition.
The use of some tactics is dependent upon the employer perception of the
ineffectiveness of others that have recently been used. Moreover some
are more suited to the legal and political culture of Britain, by contrast
to that of the United States.
Examining
the dynamics of the use of these tactics, a key point in an employer's
decision to move from trying to ignore union requests for meetings (the
most basic form of stonewalling) to others is dependent on two specific
considerations. First is whether the union walks away or whether it repeats
its requests for meetings and UR at the same time as building up its membership.
Thereafter the workers' and union's tenacity, ingenuity, strength and
staying power are the factors the employer has to contend with. Second
is whether the employer has the resources (ideology, finance and personnel)
required to implement these anti-union positions comprise. A strong ideological
conviction is particularly important so that the employer can withstand
adverse criticism in local and national media. However the other resources
may not be so readily available to the smallest companies.
Nonetheless
these forms of anti-unionism would appear to be a minority tendency amongst
employers faced by serious UR campaigns judged by the number of new UR
agreements (Gall and McKay 2001). One caveat is however worth entering
into. There are likely to be more cases of anti-unionism than are actually
apparent because of the weaknesses in union reporting systems-that is
to say, workplace union and local officials do not necessarily report
these actions to the higher levels of the union (officers and research
departments) so they are not reported to the press or union journals.
Turning
to type of employers which behave in these ways, there are three main
categories. First are those with what they would regard as "bad"
experiences of IR, comprising assertive unions (such as newspaper employers
and some offshore oil contractors) or those with low regard for trades
unionism and collective relations (such as companies from the United States,
charities and entrepreneurs). Second, there appears to be a concentration
of employer resistance by workforce size. Those small and medium sized
organizations, commonly with between 50 and 250 workers show the greatest
signs of resistance, deploying the less sophisticated means of staying
"union free". Third, many resisters appear to be relatively
new companies where the managing director is also the founder, being in
the mould of the Thatcherite "entrepreneur". The latter two
characteristics accord with the features of small businesses as employers
(Rainnie 1989; Scase and Goffee 1980).
However
to consider only the "success" of such employer activities paints
a partial picture. Union presence (membership, organization, activity)
has not always been diminished by these actions, so possibilities exist
that UR may still be obtained from these bridgeheads (60 cases). Equally
pertinent is that employers may create new or additional problems for
themselves with these tactics. With single union deals, the employer may
find the chosen union has no legitimacy or membership amongst the workforce.
Thus the union ceases to be an effective control mechanism and instability
ensues. Worse still for the employer, workers may retain or seek membership
of another union, which then campaigns for UR. In the case of constrained
agreements, the membership may rebel against the results and leave the
union, again creating problems of democratic legitimacy, of control effectiveness
and IR instability. Fear stuff may also produce instability and antagonisms,
lessening productivity and efficiency where workers respond in a robust
manner.
Endnotes
1.
This is because there is a 3-year bar on applying for UR for the same
bargaining unit should the application be rejected, the application and
adjudicating process are complex, a CAC awarded recognition deal is of
a minimal nature and an application to the CAC may further polarize industrial
relations.
2.
Although the ceiling for compensation for unfair dismissal was raised
to £50,000 by the ERA, it also abolished the "specific award"
that was available for victimization for trade union activities.
3.
McGovern (1989:68) found a similar array of tactics used by employers
in Ireland in the 1980s.
4.
The use of such lists is outlawed under Section 3 of the ERA.
5.
The ERA precludes multi-unionism whereby there are separate UR agreements
within an organization. It does not however preclude multi-unionism where
there is a single UR agreement, but this is far less likely than traditional
multi-unionism. This adds further pressure towards single unionism.
References
ACAS.
2000, 2001. Annual Report, Advisory. London: Conciliation and Arbitration
Service.
Beaumont, P. 1987.
The Decline of Trade Union Organisation. London: Croom Helm.
Bland, P. 1999.
"Trade union membership and recognition 1997–98." Labour
Market Trends (July),
pp. 343–53.
Blyton, P., and
P. Turnbull. 1998. The Dynamics of Employee Relations, 2nd ed.
London: Macmillan.
Brown, W., S. Deakin,
M. Hudson, C. Pratten, and P. Ryan. 1998. The Individualisation of
Employment
Contracts in Britain. DTI Research Paper, London.
Claydon, T. 1996.
"Union Derecognition: A Re-examination." In I. Beardwell, ed.,
Contemporary
Industrial Relations: A Critical Analysis. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, pp. 151–74.
Confederation of
British Industry. 1999. CBI Employment Legislation Impact Survey (September).
London: Confederation of British Industry.
Cully, M., S. Woodland,
A. O'Reilly, and G. Dix. 1999. Britain at Work; As Depicted By the
Workplace
Employee Relations Survey. London: Routledge.
Dibb, Lupton Allsop.
1999. Industrial Relations Survey 1999. London.
Dibb, Lupton Allsop.
2000. Industrial Relations Survey 2000. London.
Dickson, T., H.
McLachlan, P. Prior, and K. Swales. 1988. "Big Blue and the Unions:
IBM, Individualism
and Trade Union Strategy." Work, Employment and Society, Vol.
2, no. 4, pp. 506–20.
Dundon, T. 2001.
"Union Avoidance and Employer Hostility to Unions in the UK."
AFLCIO/ULEA Education Conference, Boston, MA.
Gall, G., and S.
McKay. 1994. "Trade Union Derecognition in Britain, 1988–1994."
British Journal
of Industrial Relations, Vol. 32, no. 3, pp. 433–48.
Gall, G., and S.
McKay. 1999. "Developments in Union Recognition and Derecognition
in Britain
1994–1998." British Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol.
37, no. 4, pp. 601–14.
Gall, G., and S.
McKay. 2001. "Union Recognition in Britain: The Dawn of a New Era?"
Unpublished
paper, University of Stirling.
Guest, D., and Hoque,
K. 1994. "The Good, the Bad and the Ugly: Employment Relations on
New Non-union Workplaces." Human Resource Management Journal,
Vol. 5, no. 1, pp. 1–14.
Heery, E. 2000.
"New Unionism Research Project." Bulletin No. 8, Cardiff University.
Heery, E., M. Simms,
R. Delbridge, J. Salmon, and D. Simpson. 2000a. "Union Organising
in Britain: A Survey of Policy and Practice." International Journal
of Human Resource Management, Vol. 11, no. 5, pp. 986–1007.
Heery, E., M. Simms,
R. Delbridge, J. Salmon, and D. Simpson. 2000b. "The TUC's Organising
Academy: An Assessment." Industrial Relations Journal, Vol.
31, no. 5, pp. 400–16.
McGovern, P. 1989.
"Union Recognition and Union Avoidance in the 1980s." In T.
Murphy, ed., Industrial Relations in Ireland: Contemporary Issues and
Developments. Dublin: University College Dublin, pp. 61–72.
Purcell, J., and
Sisson, K. 1983. "Strategies and Practice in the Management of Industrial
Relations."
In G. Bain, ed., Industrial Relations in Britain. Oxford: Blackwell,
pp. 95– 120.
Rainnie, A. 1989.
Industrial Relations in Small Firms: Small Isn't Beautiful. London:
Routledge.
Roy, D. 1980. "Repression
and Incorporation--Fear Stuff, Sweet Stuff and Evil Stuff: Management's
Defenses against Unionization in the South." In T. Nicols, ed., Capital
and Labour: Studies in the Capitalist Labour Process. London: Athlone
Press.
Scase, R., and Goffee,
R. 1980. The Real World of the Small Business Owner. London: Croom
Helm.
Terry, M. 1999.
"Systems of Collective Employee Representation in Non-Union Firms
in the UK." Industrial Relations Journal, Vol. 30, no. 1,
pp. 16–30.
|
