The Industrial Relations Research Association    
Proceedings 2003    

   

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II. WORK AND OLDER AMERICANS


DISCUSSION

Susan J. Stabile
St. John's University School of Law

 

     There is nothing surprising in the basic conclusion of Wial's paper, that those most likely to benefit from an increase in defined-contribution plan limits are high income earners--that is, those who are most likely to be contributing the maximum to their 401(k) plans now are likely to increase their contributions when the limits are increased. This is a conclusion that supports what the cynical among us have thought all along, that the proposal to increase plan contribution limits was always intended as a means of allowing greater tax deferral by those in higher-income tax brackets.

     It is similarly not surprising that increasing plan contribution limits will not lead to an increase in 401(k) plan contributions by lower-income earners. Many of them are not now contributing the maximum to their plans; the average plan contribution rate is in the range of seven percent (Madrian and Shea 2000). There are several possible explanations for this, including both that the benefit of tax deferral means less to lower-income workers and that such workers have other demands on their dollars. Given those realities, increasing plan limits will have no effect on such workers.

     As Wial notes, increasing contribution limits might indirectly improve the lot of lower-income workers by causing employers either to adopt new plans (increasing the number of employees eligible to participate in plans) or to increase their matching contributions (inducing eligible employees who do not currently participate in plans to participate). These are important points to consider because they address the important issue of coverage. Many of us spend a lot of time talking about how to make life better for those who are already plan participants. It is important to recognize, as the GAO numbers show, that almost half of the American workforce has no pension at all (GAO 2001). Many of those are low-income workers, precisely those who will lack adequate retirement income in the absence of an employer-sponsored retirement plan because they are unlikely to have significant savings and are unlikely to have large amounts of Social Security coming to them.

     If increasing contribution limits prompts employers to adopt new plans, the number of plan participants would increase. There is little reason, however, to believe that increasing the limit will have that effect. Wial reports that some industry groups have indicated that some small employers might find increased limits attractive enough to form new plans, but does not indicate why this is the case. There is a complete lack of evidence that the contribution limit is a factor causing employers not to adopt plans now. Indeed, as the paper cites, Employee Benefits Research Institute (EBRI) data suggests that contribution limits do not rank high on a list of reasons employers choose not to adopt plans (EBRI, n.d.).

     If employers are prompted by increased contribution limits to increase matching contributions, participation would also increase. In this context is it important to realize that not all workers who are eligible to participate in a 401(k) plan choose to do so; only between two-thirds and three-fourths of eligible employees participate in their employer's 401(k) plans (Madrian and Shea 2000). One GAO study found that the effect of an employer match is to increase participation by about 20 percent, depending on the rate of the match (GAO 1997). Research by the EBRI also found that matching contributions increase participation rates particularly among lower-income workers (EBRI 1999). Thus, if increasing contribution limits induces increased matching contributions, participation would increase.

     There are, however, no data to suggest that increasing contribution limits will result in increased matching contributions. Presumably that is likely only if the increased limits will create problems in satisfying nondiscrimination requirements because of increased plan contributions by higher-income employees. We do not know from Wial's paper, however, whether this is the case.

     As Wial recognizes, ultimately increasing contribution limits has nothing to do with the fundamental difficulties of ensuring retirement security--that many employees are not covered by pension plans and that many of those that are covered do not contribute enough to them.

References

Employee Benefits Research Institute (EBRI). 1999. "Are Workers Taking Full Advantage of Their 401(k) Plans?" EBRI news release (February 24).

Employee Benefits Research Institute (EBRI). n.d. The 2001 Small Employer Retirement Survey (SERS) Summary of Findings. Available at www.ebri.org/sers/2001/01serses.pdf.

Madrian, Brigitte C., and Dennis F. Shea. 2000. "The Power of Suggestion: Inertia in 401(k) Participation and Savings Behavior." NBER Working Paper no. 7682, p. 10.

United States General Accounting Office (GAO). 1997. 401(k) Pension Plans: Loan Provisions Enhance Participation but May Affect Income Security for Some. GAO/HEHS-98-5 (October), p. 5.

United States General Accounting Office (GAO). 2001. Private Pensions: Issues of Coverage and Increasing Contribution Limits for Defined Contribution Plans. GAO-01-846 (September), p. 3.


   

 

 

 

   
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